We develop an algorithm for detecting teacher cheating that combines information on unexpected test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answers for students in a classroom.
I. Introduction
High-powered incentive schemes are designed to align the behavior of agents with the interests of the principal implementing the system. A shortcoming of such schemes, however, is that they are likely to induce behavior distortions along other dimensions as agents seek to game the rules (see, for instance, Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991] , Baker [1992] ). The distortions may be particularly pronounced in systems with bright line rules [Glaeser and Shleifer 2001] . It may be impossible to anticipate the many ways in which a particular incentive scheme may be gamed.
Test-based accountability systems in education provide an excellent example of thie costs and benefits of high-powered incentive schemes. In an effort to improve student achievement, a number of states and districts have recently implemented programs that use student test scores to punish or reward schools. Recent federal legislation institutionalizes this practice, requiring states to test elementary students each year, rate schools on the basis of student performance, and intervene in schools that do not make sufficient improvement.
1 Several prior studies suggest that such accountability policies may be effective at raising student achievement [Richards and Sheu 1992 , Grissmer et al. 2000 , Deere and Strayer 2001 , Jacob 2002 , Carnoy and Loeb 2002 , Hanushek and Raymond 2002 . At the same time, however, researchers have documented instances of manipulation, including documented shifts away from non-tested areas or "teaching to the test" [Klein et al. 2002 , Jacob 2002 , and increasing placement in special education [Jacob 2002 , Figlio and Getzler 2002 , Cullen and Reback 2002 .
1. The federal legislation, No Child Left Behind, was passed in 2001. Prior to this legislation, virtually every state had linked test-score outcomes to school funding or required students to pass an exit examination to graduate high school. In the state of California, a policy providing for merit pay bonuses of as much as $25,000 per teacher in schools with large test score gains was recently put into place.
In this paper, we explore a very different mechanism for inflating test scores: outright cheating on the part of teachers and administrators. 2 As incentives for high test scores increase, unscrupulous teachers may be more likely to engage in a range of illicit activities, including changing student responses on answer sheets, providing correct answers to students, or obtaining copies of an exam illegitimately prior to the test date and teaching students using knowledge of the precise exam questions. 3 While such allegations may seem far-fetched, documented cases of cheating have recently been uncovered in California [May 2000 ], Massachusetts [Marcus 2000 ], New York [Loughran and Comiskey 1999] , Texas [Kolker 1999] , and Great Britain [Hofkins 1995 , Tysome 1994 ].
There has been very little previous empirical analysis of teacher cheating. 4 The few studies that do exist involve investigations of specific instances of cheating and generally rely on the analysis of erasure patterns and the controlled retesting of students. 5 While this earlier research provides convincing evidence of isolated cheating incidents, our paper represents the first systematic attempt to (1) identify the overall prevalence of teacher cheating empirically and 2. Hereafter, we uses the phrase "teacher cheating" to encompass cheating done by either teachers or administrators. 3. We have no way of knowing whether the patterns we observe arise because a teacher explicitly alters students' answer sheets, directly provides answers to students during a test, or perhaps makes test materials available to students in advance of the exam (for instance, by teaching a reading passage that is on the test). If we had access to the actual exams, it might be possible to distinguish between these scenarios through an analysis of erasure patterns. 4. In contrast, there is a well-developed statistics literature for identifying whether one student has copied answers from another student [Wollack 1997; Holland 1996; Frary 1993; Bellezza and Bellezza 1989; Fray, Tideman and Watts 1977; Angoff 1974] . These methods involve the identification of unusual patterns of agreement in student responses and, for the most part, are only effective in identifying the most egregious cases of copying. 5. In the mid-eighties, Perlman [1985] investigated suspected cheating in a number of Chicago public schools (CPS). The study included 23 suspect schools-identified on the basis of a high percentage of erasures, unusual patterns of score increases, unnecessarily large orders of blank answer sheets for the ITBS and tips to the CPS Office of Research-along with 17 comparison schools. When a second form of the test was administered to the 40 schools under more controlled conditions, the suspect schools did much worse than the comparison schools. An analysis of several dozen Los Angeles schools where the percentage of erasures and changed answers were unusually high revealed evidence of teacher cheating [Aiken 1991] . One of the most highly publicized cheating scandals involved Stratfield elementary, an award-winning school in Connecticut. In 1996, the firm that developed and scored the exam found that the rate of erasures at Stratfield was up to five times greater than other schools in the same district and that 89 percent of erasures at Stratfield were from an incorrect to a correct response. Subsequent retesting resulted in significantly lower scores [Lindsay 1996 ].
(2) analyze the factors that predict cheating. To address these questions, we use detailed administrative data from the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) that includes the question-byquestion answers given by every student in grades 3 to 8 who took the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) from 1993 to 2000. 6 In addition to the test responses, we also have access to each student's full academic record, including past test scores, the school and room to which a student was assigned, and extensive demographic and socio-economic characteristics.
Our approach to detecting classroom cheating combines two types of indicators:
unexpected test score fluctuations and unusual patterns of answers for students within a classroom. Teacher cheating increases the likelihood that students in a classroom will experience large, unexpected increases in test scores one year, followed by very small test score gains (or even declines) the following year. Teacher cheating, especially if done in an unsophisticated manner, is also likely to leave tell-tale signs in the form of blocks of identical answers, unusual patterns of correlations across student answers within the classroom, or unusual response patterns within a student's exam (e.g., a student who answers a number of very difficult questions correctly while missing many simple questions). Our identification strategy exploits the fact that these two types of indicators are very weakly correlated in classrooms unlikely to have cheated, but very highly correlated in situations where cheating likely occurred. That allows us to credibly estimate the prevalence of cheating without having to invoke arbitrary cutoffs as to what constitutes cheating.
Empirically, we detect cheating in approximately four to five percent of the classes in our sample. This estimate is likely to understate the true incidence of cheating for two reasons.
First, we focus only on the most egregious type of cheating, where teachers systematically alter student test forms. There are other more subtle ways in which teachers can cheat, such as providing extra time to students, that our algorithm is unlikely to detect. Second, even when test forms are altered, our approach is only partially successful in detecting illicit behavior. As discussed later, when we ourselves simulate cheating by altering student answer strings and then testing for cheating in the artificially manipulated classrooms, many instances of moderate cheating go undetected by our methods.
A number of patterns in the results reinforce our confidence that what we measure is indeed cheating. First, simulation results demonstrate that there is nothing mechanical about our identification approach that automatically generates patterns like those observed in the data.
When we randomly assign students to classrooms and search for cheating in these simulated classes, our methods find little evidence of cheating. Second, cheating on one part of the test (e.g., math) is a strong predictor of cheating on other sections of the test (e.g., reading). Third, cheating is also correlated within classrooms over time and across classrooms in a particular school. Finally, and perhaps most convincingly, with the cooperation of the Chicago Public Schools we were able to conduct a prospective test of our methods in which we retested a subset of classrooms under controlled conditions that precluded teacher cheating. Classrooms identified as likely cheaters experienced large declines in test scores on the retest, whereas classrooms not suspected of cheating maintained their test score gains.
The prevalence of cheating is also shown to respond to relatively minor changes in teacher incentives. The importance of standardized tests in the Chicago Public Schools increased substantially with a change in leadership in 1996, particularly for low-achieving students.
Following the introduction of these policies, the prevalence of cheating rose sharply in lowachieving classrooms, whereas classes with average or higher-achieving students showed no increase in cheating. Cheating prevalence also appears to be systematically lower in cases where the costs of cheating are higher (e.g. in mixed-grade classrooms in which two different exams are administered simultaneously), or the benefits of cheating are lower (e.g. in classrooms with more special education or bilingual students who take the standardized tests, but whose scores are excluded from official calculations).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the set of indicators we use to capture cheating behavior. Section III describes our identification strategy.
Section IV provides a brief overview of the institutional details of the Chicago Public Schools and the data set that we use. Section V reports the basic empirical results on the prevalence of cheating and presents a wide range of evidence supporting the interpretation of these results as cheating. Section VI analyzes how teacher cheating responds to incentives. Section VII discusses the results and the implications for increasing reliance on high-stakes testing.
II. Indicators of Teacher Cheating
Teacher cheating, especially in extreme cases, is likely to leave tell-tale signs. In motivating our discussion of the indicators we employ for detecting cheating, it is instructive to compare two actual classrooms taking the same test (see Figure I ). Each row in Figure I represents one student's answers to each item on the test. Columns correspond to the different questions asked. The letter "A," "B," "C," or "D" means a student provided the correct answer.
If a number is entered, the student answered the question incorrectly, with "1" corresponding to a wrong answer of "A," "2" corresponding to a wrong answer of "B," etc. On the right-hand side of the table, we also present student test scores for the preceding, current, and following year.
Test scores are in units of "grade equivalents." The grading scale is normed so that a student at the national average for sixth graders taking the test in the eighth month of the school year would score 6.8. A typical student would be expected to gain one grade equivalent for each year of school.
The top panel of data shows a class in which we suspect teacher cheating took place; the bottom panel corresponds to a typical classroom. Two striking differences between the classrooms are readily apparent. First, in the cheating classroom, a large block of students provided identical answers on consecutive questions in the middle of the test, as indicated by the boxed area in the figure. For the other classroom, no such pattern exists. Second, looking at the pattern of test scores, students in the cheating classroom experienced large increases in test scores from the previous to the current year (1.7 grade equivalents on average), and actually experienced declines on average the following year. In contrast, the students in the typical classroom gained roughly one grade equivalent each year, as would be expected.
The indicators we use as evidence of cheating formalize and extend the basic picture that emerges from Figure I . We divide these indicators into two distinct groups that respectively capture unusual test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answer strings. In this section, we describe informally the measures that we use. A more rigorous treatment of their construction is provided in the appendix.
III.A. Indictor One: Unexpected test score fluctuations
Given that the aim of cheating is to raise test scores, one signal of teacher cheating is an unusually large gain in test scores relative to how those same students tested in the previous year.
Since test score gains that result from cheating do not represent real gains in knowledge, there is no reason to expect the gains to be sustained on future exams taken by these students (unless, of course, next year's teachers also cheat on behalf of the students). Thus, large gains due to cheating should be followed by unusually small test score gains for these students in the following year. The quickest and easiest way for a teacher to cheat is to alter the same block of consecutive questions for a substantial portion of students in the class, as was apparently done in the classroom in the top panel of Figure I . More sophisticated interventions might involve 7. We also experimented with more complicated mechanisms for defining large or small test score gains (e.g., predicting each student's expected test score gain as a function of past test scores and background characteristics and computing a deviation measure for each student which was then aggregated to the classroom level), but because the results were similar we elected to use the simpler method. We have also defined gains and losses using an absolute metric (e.g., where gains in excess of 1.5 or 2 grade equivalents are considered unusually large), and obtain comparable results. 8. In the following year the students who were in a particular classroom are typically scattered across multiple classrooms. We base all calculations off of the composition of this year's class.
skipping some questions so as to avoid a large block of identical answers, or altering different blocks of questions for different students.
We combine four different measures of how suspicious a classroom's answer strings are in determining whether a classroom may be cheating. The first measure focuses on the most unlikely block of identical answers given by students on consecutive questions. Using past test scores, future test scores, and background characteristics, we predict the likelihood that each student will give each possible answer (A, B, C or D) on every question using a multinomial logit. Each student's predicted probability of choosing a particular response is identified by the likelihood that other students (in the same year, grade and subject) with similar background characteristics will choose that response. We then search over all combinations of students and consecutive questions to find the block of identical answers given by students in a classroom least likely to have arisen by chance. 9 The more unusual is the most unusual block of test responses (adjusting for class size and the number of questions on the exam, both of which increase the possible combinations over which we search), the more likely it is that cheating occurred. Thus, if ten very bright students in a class of thirty give the correct answers to the first five questions on the exam (typically the easier questions), the block of identical answers will not appear unusual. In contrast, if all fifteen students in a low-achieving classroom give the same correct answers to the last five questions on the exam (typically the harder questions), this would appear quite suspect.
The second measure of suspicious answer strings involves the overall degree of correlation in student answers across the test. When a teacher changes answers on test forms, it 9. Note that we do not require the answers to be correct. Indeed, in many classrooms, the most unusual strings include some incorrect answers. Note also that these calculations are done under the assumption that a given student's answers are uncorrelated (conditional on observables) across questions on the exam, and that answers are uncorrelated across students. Of course, this assumption is unlikely to be true. Since all of our comparisons rely on presumably increases the uniformity of student test forms across students in the class. This measure is meant to capture more general patterns of similarity in student responses beyond just identical blocks of answers. Based on the results of the multinomial logit described above, for each question and each student we create a measure of how unexpected the student's response was. We then combine the information for each student in the classroom to create something akin to the within-classroom correlation in student responses. This measure will be high if students in a classroom tend to give the same answers on many questions, especially if the answers given are unexpected (i.e., correct answers on hard questions or systematic mistakes on easy questions).
Of course, within-classroom correlation may arise for many reasons other than cheating (e.g., the teacher may emphasize certain topics during the school year). Therefore, a third indicator of potential cheating is a high variance in the degree of correlation across questions. If the teacher changes answers for multiple students on selected questions, the within-class correlation on those particular questions will be extremely high, while the degree of within-class correlation on other questions is likely to be typical. This leads the cross-question variance in correlations to be larger than normal in cheating classrooms.
Our final indicator compares the answers that students in one classroom give compared to other students in the system who take the identical test and get the exact same score. This measure relies on the fact that questions vary significantly in difficulty. The typical student will answer most of the easy questions correctly, but get many of the hard questions wrong (where "easy" and "hard" are based on how well students of similar ability do on the question). If the relative unusualness of the answers given in different classrooms, this simplifying assumption is not problematic unless the correlation within and across students varies by classroom. students in a class systematically miss the easy questions while correctly answering the hard questions, this may be an indication of cheating.
Our overall measure of suspicious answer strings is constructed in a manner parallel to our measure of unusual test score fluctuations. Within a given subject, grade, and year, we rank classrooms on each of these four indicators, and then take the sum of squared ranks across the four measures:
In the empirical work, we again use three possible cutoffs for potential cheating: eightieth, ninetieth, and ninetieth-fifth percentiles.
III. A Strategy for Identifying The Prevalence of Cheating
The previous section described indicators that are likely to be correlated with cheating.
Because sometimes such patterns arise by chance, however, not every classroom with large test score fluctuations and suspicious answer strings is cheating. Furthermore, the particular choice of what qualifies as a "large" fluctuation or a "suspicious" set of answer strings will necessarily be arbitrary. In this section, we present an identification strategy that, under a set of defensible assumptions, nonetheless provides estimates of the prevalence of cheating.
To identify the number of cheating classrooms in a given year, we would like to compare the observed joint distribution of test score fluctuations and suspicious answer strings to a counterfactual distribution in which no cheating occurs. Differences between the two distributions would provide an estimate of how much cheating occurred. If teachers in a particular school or year are cheating, there will be more classrooms exhibiting both unusual test 10. Because different subjects and grades have differing numbers of questions, it is difficult to make meaningful comparisons across tests on the raw indicators. score fluctuations and suspicious answer strings than otherwise expected. In practice, we do not have the luxury of observing such a counterfactual. Instead, we must make assumptions about what the patterns would look like absent cheating.
Our identification strategy hinges on three key assumptions: (1) cheating increases the likelihood a class will have both large test score fluctuations and suspicious answer strings, (2) if cheating classrooms had not cheated, their distribution of test score fluctuations and answer strings patterns would be identical to non-cheating classrooms, and (3) in non-cheating classrooms, the correlation between test score fluctuations and suspicious answers is constant throughout the distribution.
11
If assumption (1) holds, then cheating classrooms will be concentrated in the upper tail of the joint distribution of unusual test score fluctuations and suspicious answer strings. Other parts of the distribution (e.g., classrooms ranked in the fiftieth to seventy-fifth percentile of suspicious answer strings) will consequently include few cheaters. As long as cheating classrooms would look similar to non-cheating classrooms on our measures if they had not cheated (assumption 2), classes in the part of the distribution with few cheaters provide the non-cheating counterfactual that we are seeking.
The difficulty, however, is that we only observe this non-cheating counterfactual in the 12 The graph combines all classrooms and all subjects in our data. 13 Over most of the range (roughly from zero to seventy-fifth percentile on the horizontal axis), there is a slight positive correlation between unusual test scores and suspicious answer strings. This is the part of the distribution that is unlikely to contain many cheating classrooms. Under the assumption that the correlation between our two measures is constant in non-cheating classrooms over the whole distribution, we would predict that the straight line observed for all but the right-hand portion of the graph would continue all the way to the right edge of the graph.
Instead, as one approaches the extreme right tail of the distribution of suspicious answer strings, the probability of large test score fluctuations rises dramatically. That sharp rise, we argue, is a consequence of cheating. To estimate the prevalence of cheating, we simply compare the actual area under the curve in the far right tail of Figure 1 to the predicted area under the curve in the right tail projecting the linear relationship observed from the fiftieth to seventy-fifth h percentile out to the ninety-ninth percentile. Because this identification strategy is necessarily indirect, we devote a great deal of attention to presenting a wide variety of tests of the validity of 11. We formally derive the mathematical model described in this section in Jacob and Levitt [2002] . 12. The choice of the ninetieth-fifth percentile is somewhat arbitrary. In the empirical work that follows we also consider the 80 th and 90 th percentiles. The choice of the cutoff does not affect the basic patterns observed in the data. 13. To construct the figure, classes were rank ordered according to their answer strings and divided into 200 equally-sized segments. The circles in the figure represent these 200 local means. The line displayed in the graph is the fitted value of a regression with a seventh-order polynomial in a classroom's rank on the suspicious strings our approach, the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions, and the plausibility of our findings.
IV. Data and Institutional Background
Elementary students in Chicago public schools take a standardized, multiple-choice achievement exam known as the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS). The ITBS is a national, norm-referenced exam with a reading comprehension section and three separate math sections.
14 Third through eighth grade students in Chicago are required to take the exams each year. Most schools administer the exams to first and second grade students as well, although this is not a district mandate.
Our base sample includes all students in third to seventh grade for the years 1993-2000. 15 For each student, we have the question-by-question answer string on each year's tests, school and classroom identifiers, the full history of prior and future test scores, and demographic variables including age, sex, race, and free lunch eligibility. We also have information about a wide range of school-level characteristics. We do not, however, have individual teacher identifiers, so we are unable to directly link teachers to classrooms or to track a particular teacher over time.
Because our cheating proxies rely on comparisons to past and future test scores, we drop observations that are missing reading or math scores in either the preceding year or the following measure. 14. There are also other parts of the test which are either not included in official school reporting (spelling, punctuation, grammar) or are given only in select grades (science and social studies), for which we do not have information. 15. We also have test scores for eighth graders, but we exclude them because our algorithm requires test score data for the following year and the ITBS test is not administered to ninth graders. year (in addition to those with missing test scores in the baseline year). 16 Less than one-half of one percent of students with missing demographic data are also excluded from the analysis.
Finally, because our algorithms for identifying cheating rely on identifying suspicious patterns within a classroom, our methods have little power in classrooms with small numbers of students.
Consequently, we drop all classrooms for which we have fewer than ten valid students in a particular grade after our other exclusions (roughly three percent of students). A handful of classrooms recorded as having more than 40 students -presumably multiple classrooms not separately identified in the data -are also dropped. Our final data set contains roughly 20,000 students per grade per year distributed across approximately 1,000 classrooms, for a total of over 40,000 classroom-years of data (with four subject tests per classroom-year) and over 700,000 student-year observations.
Summary statistics for the full sample of classrooms are shown in Table I where the unit of observation is at the level of class*subject*year. As in many urban school districts, students in Chicago are disproportionately poor and minority. Roughly 60 percent of students are Black and 26 percent are Hispanic, with nearly 85 percent receiving free or reduced price lunch. Less than 29 percent of students scored at or above national norms in reading.
The ITBS exams are administered over a weeklong period in early May. Third grade teachers are permitted to administer the exam to their own students, while other teachers switch classes to administer the exams. The exams are generally delivered to the schools one to two weeks before testing, and are supposed to be kept in a secure location by the principal or the 16. The exact number of students with missing test data varies by year and grade. Overall, we drop roughly 12 percent of students because of missing test score information in the baseline year. These are students who (i) were not tested because of placement in bilingual or special education programs or (ii) simply missed the exam that particular year. In addition to these students, we also drop approximately 13 percent of students who were missing test scores in either the preceding or following years. Test data may be missing either because a student did not attend school on the days of the test, or because the student transferred into the CPS system in the current year or left the system prior to the next year of testing.
school's test coordinator, an individual in the school designated to coordinate the testing process (often a counselor or administrator). Each section of the exam consists of 30 to 60 multiple choice questions which students are given between 30 and 75 minutes to complete. 17 Students mark their responses on answer sheets, which are scanned to determine a student's score. There is no penalty for guessing. A student's raw score is simply calculated as the sum of correct responses on the exam. The raw score is then translated into a grade equivalent.
After collecting student exams, teachers or administrators then "clean" the answer keys, erasing stray pencil marks, removing dirt or debris from the form, and darkening item responses that were only faintly marked by the student. At the end of the testing week, the test coordinators at each school deliver the completed answer keys and exams to the CPS central office. School personnel are not supposed to keep copies of the actual exams, although school officials acknowledge that a number of teachers each year do so. The CPS has administered three different versions of the ITBS between 1993 and 2000. The CPS alternates forms each year, with new forms being offered for the first time in 1993, 1994 and 1997. 18 V. The Prevalence of Teacher Cheating
As noted earlier, our estimates of the prevalence of cheating are derived from a comparison of the actual number of classrooms that are above some threshold on both of our cheating indicators, relative to the number we would expect to observe based on the correlation between these two measures in the 50 th -75 th percentiles of the suspicious string measure. The top panel of Table 2 presents our estimates of the percentage of classrooms that are cheating on 17. The mathematics and reading tests measure basic skills. The reading comprehension exam consists of three to eight short passages followed by up to nine questions relating to the passage The math exam consists of three sections that assess number concepts, problem-solving and computation. 18. These three forms are used for retesting, summer school testing, and mid-year testing as well, so that it is average on a given subject test (i.e. reading comprehension or one of the three math tests) in a given year. 19 Because the decision as to what cutoff signifies a "high" value on our cheating indicators is arbitrary, we present a 3 x 3 matrix of estimates using three different thresholds (eightieth, ninetieth, and ninetieth-fifth percentiles) for each of our cheating measures. The estimated prevalence of cheaters ranges from 1.1 percent to 2.1 percent, depending on the particular set of cutoffs used. As would be expected, the number of cheaters is generally declining as higher thresholds are employed. Nonetheless, it is encouraging that over such a wide set of cutoffs, the range of estimates is relatively tight.
The bottom panel of Table 2 presents estimates of the percentage of classrooms that are cheating on any of the four subject tests in a particular year. If every classroom that cheated did so only on one subject test, than the results in the bottom panel would simply be four times the results in the top panel. In many instances, however, classrooms appear to cheat on multiple subjects. Thus, the prevalence rates range from 3.4-5.6 percent of all classrooms. 20 Because of the necessarily indirect nature of our identification strategy, we explore a range of supplementary tests designed to assess the validity of the estimates.
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likely that over the years, teachers have seen the same exam on a number of occasions. 19. It is important to note that we exclude a particular form of cheating that appears to be quite prevalent in the data: teachers randomly filling in answers left blank by students at the end of the exam. In many classrooms, almost every student will end the test with a long string of the identical answers (typically all the same response like "B" or "D.") The fact that almost all students in the class coordinate on the same pattern strongly suggests that the students themselves did not fill in the blanks, or were under explicit instructions by the teacher to do so. Since there is no penalty for guessing on the test, filling in the blanks can only increase student test scores. While this type of teacher behavior is likely to be viewed by many as unethical, we do not make it the focus of our analysis because (1) it is difficult to provide definitive evidence of such behavior (a teacher could argue that he or she instructed students well in advance of the test to fill in all blanks with the letter "C" as part of good test-taking strategy), and (2) in our minds it is categorically different than a teacher who systematically changes student responses to the correct answer. 20. Computation of the overall prevalence is somewhat complicated because it involves calculating not only how many classrooms are actually above the thresholds on multiple subject tests, but also how frequently this would occur in the absence of cheating. Details on these calculations are available from the authors. 21. In an earlier version of this paper [Jacob and Levitt 2002] , we present a number of additional sensitivity analyses that confirm the basic results. First, we test whether our results are sensitive to the way in which we predict the prevalence of high values of ANSWERS and SCORE in the upper part of the other distribution (e.g., fitting a linear or quadratic model to the data in the lower portion of the distribution versus simply using the average value from the 50-75 th percentiles). We find our results are extremely robust. Second, we examine whether our results
V.A. Simulation Results
Our prevalence estimates may be biased downward or upward, depending on the extent to which our algorithm fails to successfully identify all instances of cheating ("false negatives") versus the frequency with which we wrongly classify a teacher as cheating ("false positive").
One simple simulation exercise we undertook with respect to possible false positives involves randomly assigning students to hypothetical classrooms. These synthetic classrooms thus consist of students who in actuality had no connection to one another. We then analyze these hypothetical classrooms using the same algorithm applied to the actual data. As one would hope, no evidence of cheating was found in the simulated classes. Indeed, the estimated prevalence of cheating was slightly negative in this simulation (i.e., classrooms with large test score increases in the current year followed by big declines the next year were slightly less likely to have unusual patterns of answer strings). Thus, there does not appear to be anything mechanical in our algorithm that generates evidence of cheating.
A second simulation involves artificially altering a classroom's answer strings in ways that we believe mimic teacher cheating or outstanding teaching. 22 We are then able to see how frequently we label these altered classes as "cheating" and how this varies with the extent and nature of the changes we make to a classroom's answers. We simulate two different types of teacher cheating. The first is a very naive version, in which a teacher starts cheating at the same question for a number of students and changes consecutive questions to the right answers for these students, creating a block of identical and correct responses. The second type of cheating might simply be due to mean reversion by testing whether classrooms with suspicious answer strings are less likely to maintain large test score gains. Among a sample of classrooms with large test score gains, we find that mean reversion is substantially greater among the set of classes with highly suspicious answer strings. Third, we investigate whether we might be detecting student rather than teacher cheating by examining whether students who have suspicious answer strings in one year are more likely to have suspicious answer strings in other years. We find that they do not. 22. See Jacob and Levitt [2002] for the precise details of this simulation exercise.
is much more sophisticated: we randomly change answers from incorrect to correct for selected students in a class. The outcome of this simulation reveals that our methods are surprisingly weak in detecting moderate cheating, even in the naïve case. For instance, when three consecutive answers are changed to correct for 25 percent of a class, we catch such behavior only four percent of the time. Even when six questions are changed for half of the class, we catch the cheating in less than sixty percent of the cases. Only when the cheating is very extreme (e.g., six answers changed for the entire class) are we very likely to catch the cheating. The explanation for this poor performance is that classrooms with low test-score gains, even with the boost provided by this cheating, do not have large enough test score fluctuations to make them appear unusual because there is so much inherent volatility in test scores. When the cheating takes the more sophisticated form described above, we are even less successful at catching low and moderate cheaters (two percent and 34 percent respectively in the first two scenarios described above), but we almost always detect very extreme cheating.
From a political or equity perspective, however, we may be even more concerned with false positives, specifically the risk of accusing highly effective teachers of cheating. Hence, we also simulate the impact of a good teacher, changing certain answers for certain students from incorrect to correct responses. Our manipulations in this case differs from the cheating simulations above in two ways: (1) we allow some of the gains to be preserved in the following year, and (2) we alter questions such that students will not get random answers correct, but rather will tend to show the greatest improvement on the easiest questions that the students were getting wrong. These simulation results suggest that only rarely are good teachers mistakenly labeled as cheaters. For instance, a teacher whose prowess allows him or her to raise test scores by six questions for half the students in the class (more than a 0.5 grade equivalent increase on average for the class) is labeled a cheater only two percent of the time. In contrast, a naïve cheater with the same test score gains is correctly identified as a cheater in more than fifty percent of cases.
In another test for false positives, we explored whether we might be mistaking emphasis on certain subject material for cheating. For example, if a math teacher spends several months on fractions with a particular class, one would expect the class to do particularly well on all of the math questions relating to fractions and perhaps worse than average on other math questions.
One might imagine a similar scenario in reading if, for example, a teacher creates a lengthy unit on the Underground Railroad, which later happens to appear in a passage on the reading comprehension exam.
To examine this, we analyze the nature of the across-question correlations in cheating versus non-cheating classrooms. We find that the most highly correlated questions in cheating classrooms are no more likely to measure the same skill (e.g., fractions, geometry) than in non-cheating classrooms. The implication of these results is that the prevalence estimates presented above are likely to substantially understate the true extent of cheating -there is little evidence of false positives -but we frequently miss moderate cases of cheating.
V.B. The Correlation of Cheating Indicators across Subjects, Classrooms and Years
If what we are detecting is truly cheating, then one would expect that a teacher who cheats on one part of the test would be more likely to cheat on other parts of the test. Also, a teacher who cheats one year would be more likely to cheat the following year. Finally, to the extent that cheating is either condoned by the principal or carried out by the test coordinator, one would expect to find multiple classes in a school cheating in any given year, and perhaps even that cheating in a school one year predicts cheating in future years. If what we are detecting is not cheating, then one would not necessarily expect to find strong correlation in our cheating indicators across exams for a specific classroom, across classrooms, or across years. Table 3 reports regression results testing these predictions. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether we believe a classroom is likely to be cheating on a particular subject test using our most stringent definition (above the ninetieth-fifth percentile on both cheating indicators). The baseline probability of qualifying as a cheater for this cutoff is 1.1 percent. To fully appreciate the enormity of the effects implied by the table, it is important to keep this very low baseline in mind. We report estimates from linear probability models (probits yield similar marginal effects), with standard errors clustered at the school level.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that cheating on other tests in the same year is an extremely powerful predictor of cheating in a different subject. If a classroom cheats on exactly one other subject test, the predicted probability of cheating on this test increases by over ten percentage points. Since the baseline cheating rates are only 1.1 percent, classrooms cheating on exactly one other test are ten times more likely to have cheated on this subject than are classrooms that did not cheat on any of the other subjects (which is the omitted category). Classrooms that cheat on two other subjects are almost 30 times more likely to cheat on this test, relative to those not cheating on other tests. If a class cheats on all three other subjects, it is 50 times more likely to also cheat on this test.
There also is evidence of correlation in cheating within schools. A ten percentage-point increase in cheating classrooms in a school (excluding the classroom in question) on the same subject test raises the likelihood this class cheats by roughly .016 percentage points. This potentially suggests some role for centralized cheating by a school counselor, test coordinator or the principal, rather than by teachers operating independently. There is little evidence that cheating rates within the school on other subject tests affect cheating on this test.
When making comparisons across years (columns 3 and 4), it is important to note that we do not actually have teacher identifiers. We do, however, know what classroom a student is assigned to. Thus, we can only compare the correlation between past and current cheating in a given classroom. To the extent that teacher turnover occurs or teachers switch classrooms, this proxy will be contaminated. Even given this important limitation, cheating in the classroom last year predicts cheating this year. In column 3, for example, we see that classrooms that cheated in the same subject last year are 9.6 percentage points more likely to cheat this year, even after we control for cheating on other subjects in the same year and cheating in other classes in the school. Column 4 shows that prior cheating in the school strongly predicts the likelihood that a classroom will cheat this year.
V.C. Evidence from Retesting under Controlled Circumstances
Perhaps the most compelling evidence for our methods comes from the results of a unique policy intervention. In spring 2002, the Chicago Public Schools provided us the opportunity to retest over 100 classrooms under controlled circumstances that precluded cheating, a few weeks after the initial ITBS exam was administered. 23 Based on suspicious answer strings and unusual test score gains on the initial spring 2002 exam, we identified a set of classrooms most likely to have cheated. In addition, we chose a second group of classrooms that had suspicious answer strings but did not have large test score gains, a pattern that is consistent with a bad teacher who attempts to mask a poor teaching performance by cheating. We also retested two sets of classrooms as control groups. The first control group consisted of classes with large test score gains but no evidence of cheating in their answer strings, a potential indication of effective teaching. These classes would be expected to maintain their gains when 23 . Full details of this policy experiment are reported in Jacob and Levitt [2003] . The results of the retests were used by CPS to initiate disciplinary action against a number of teachers, principals and staff.
retested, subject to possible mean reversion. The second control group consisted of randomly selected classrooms.
The results of the retests are reported in Table IV classrooms prospectively identified as having "good teachers" (i.e., classrooms with large gains but not suspicious answer strings) actually scored even higher on the reading retest than they did on the initial test. The math scores fell slightly on retesting, but these classrooms continued to experience extremely large gains. The randomly selected classrooms also maintained almost all of their gains when retested, as would be expected. In summary, our methods proved to be extremely effective both in identifying likely cheaters and in correctly classifying teachers who achieved large test score gains in a legitimate manner.
VI. Does Teacher Cheating Respond to Incentives?
From the perspective of economics, perhaps the most interesting question related to teacher cheating is the degree to which it responds to incentives. As noted in the introduction, there were two major changes in the incentives faced by teachers and students over our sample period. Prior to 1996, ITBS scores were primarily used to provide teachers and parents with a sense of how a child was progressing academically. Beginning in 1996 with the appointment of Paul Vallas as CEO of Schools, the CPS launched an initiative designed to hold students and teachers accountable for student learning.
The reform had two main elements. The first involved putting schools "on probation" if less than 15 percent of students scored at or above national norms on the ITBS reading exams.
The CPS did not use math performance to determine probation status. Probation schools that do not exhibit sufficient improvement may be reconstituted, a procedure that involves closing the school and dismissing or reassigning all of the school staff. 24 It is clear from our discussions with teachers and administrators that being on probation is viewed as an extremely undesirable circumstance. The second piece of the accountability reform was an end to social promotionthe practice of passing students to the next grade regardless of their academic skills or school performance. Under the new policy, students in third, sixth and eighth grade must meet minimum standards on the ITBS in both reading and mathematics in order to be promoted to the next grade. The promotion standards were implemented in spring 1997 for third and sixth 24. For a more detailed analysis of the probation policy, see Jacob [2002] and Jacob and Lefgren [forthcoming] .
graders. Promotion decisions are based solely on scores in reading comprehension and mathematics. 25 The unit of observation is a classroom*subject*grade*year. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether we suspect the classroom cheated using our most stringent definition: a classroom is designated a cheater if both its test score fluctuations and the suspiciousness of its answer strings are above the ninetieth-fifth percentile for that grade, subject and year.
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In column 1, the policy changes are restricted to have a constant impact across all classrooms. The introduction of the social promotion and probation policies is positively correlated with the likelihood of classroom cheating, although the point estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Much more interesting results emerge when we interact the policy changes with the previous year's test scores for the classroom. For both probation and social promotion, cheating rates in the lowest performing classrooms prove to be quite responsive to the change in incentives. In column 2, we see that a classroom one standard deviation below the mean increased its likelihood of cheating by 0.43 percentage points in response to the school probation policy and roughly 0.65 percentage points due to the ending of social promotion. Given a baseline rate of cheating of 1.1 percent, these effects are substantial.
The magnitude of these changes are particularly large considering that no elementary school on probation was actually reconstituted during this period, and that the social promotion policy has a direct impact on students, but not direct ramifications for teacher pay or rewards. A classroom 25. Logit and Probit models evaluated at the mean yield comparable results, so the estimates from a linear probability model are presented for ease of interpretation. 26. The results are not sensitive to the cheating cutoff used. Note that this measure may include error due to both false positives and negatives. Since the measurement error is in the dependent variable, the primary impact will one standard deviation above the mean does not see any significant change in cheating in response to these two policies. Such classes are very unlikely to be located in schools at risk for being put on probation, and also are likely to have few students at risk for being retained. These findings are robust to adding a number of classroom and school characteristics (column 3) as well as school*year fixed effects (column 4).
Cheating also appears to be responsive to other costs and benefits. Classrooms that tested poorly last year are much more likely to cheat. For example, a classroom with average student prior achievement one classroom standard deviation below the mean is 23 percent more likely to cheat. Classrooms with students in multiple grades are 65 percent less likely to cheat than classrooms where all students are in the same grade. This is consistent with the fact that it is likely more difficult for teachers in such classrooms to cheat, since they must administer two different test forms to students, which will necessarily have different correct answers.
Moreover, classes with a higher proportion of students who are included in the official test reporting are more likely to cheat-a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of students in a class whose test scores "count" will increase the likelihood of cheating by roughly 20 percent. 27 Teachers who administer the exam to their own students are 0.67 percentage points --approximately 50 percent --more likely to cheat.
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A few other notable results emerge. First, there is no statistically significant impact on cheating of reusing a test form that has been administered in a previous year. That finding is of interest because it suggests that teachers taking old exams and teaching the precise questions to likely be to simply decrease the precision of our estimates. 27. Consistent with this finding, within cheating classrooms, teachers are less likely to alter the answer sheets for students who are excluded from test reporting. Teachers also appear to less frequently cheat for boys and for older students. 28. In an earlier version of the paper [Jacob and Levitt 2002] , we examine for which students teachers tend to cheat. We find that teachers are most likely to cheat for students in the second quartile of the national ability distribution (twenty-fifth to fiftieth percentile) in the previous year, consistent with the incentives under the students is not an important component of what we are detecting as cheating (although anecdotal evidence suggests this practice exists). Classrooms in schools with lower achievement, higher poverty rates and more Black students are more likely to cheat. Classrooms in schools with teachers who graduated from more prestigious undergraduate institutions are less likely to cheat, whereas classrooms in schools with younger teachers are more likely to cheat.
VII. Conclusion
This paper develops an algorithm for determining the prevalence of teacher cheating on standardized tests and applies the results to data from the Chicago Public Schools. Our methods reveal thousands of instances of classroom cheating, representing 4-5 percent of the classrooms each year. Moreover, we find that teacher cheating appears quite responsive to relatively minor changes in incentives.
The obvious benefits of high-stakes tests as a means of providing incentives must therefore be weighed against the possible distortions that these measures induce. Explicit cheating is merely one form of distortion. Indeed, the kind of cheating we focus on is one that could be greatly reduced at a relatively low cost through the implementation of proper safeguards, such as is done by Educational Testing Service on the SAT or GRE exams.
29
Even if this particular form of cheating were eliminated, however, there are a virtually infinite number of dimensions along which strategic school personnel can act to game the current system. For instance, Figlio and Winicki [2001] and Rohlfs [2002] document that schools attempt to increase the caloric intake of students on test days, and disruptive students are probation policy. 29. Although even tests administered by the Educational Testing Service is not immune to cheating, as evidenced by recent reports that many of the GRE scores from China are fraudulent [Contreras 2002 ].
especially likely to be suspended from school during official testing periods ]. It may be prohibitively costly or even impossible to completely safeguard the system.
Finally, this paper fits into a small but growing body of research focused on identifying corrupt or illicit behavior on the part of economic actors [see Porter and Zona 1993 , Fisman 2000 , Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2001 , Duggan and Levitt, 2002 . Because individuals engaged in such behavior actively attempt to hide their trails, the intellectual exercise associated with uncovering their misdeeds differs substantially from the typical economic application in which the researcher starts with a well defined measure of the outcome variable (e.g. earnings, economic growth, profits) and then attempts to uncover the determinants of these outcomes. In the case of corruption, there is typically no clear outcome variable, making it necessary for the researcher to employ non-standard approaches in generating such a measure.
Appendix A: The Construction of Suspicious String Measures
This appendix describes in greater detail how we construct each of our measures of unexpected or suspicious responses.
The first measure focuses on the most unlikely block of identical answers given on consecutive questions. Using past test scores, future test scores and background characteristics, we predict the likelihood that each student will give each answer on each question. For each item, a student has four choices (A, B, C or D), only one of which is correct. We estimate a multinomial logit for each item on the exam in order to predict how students will respond to each question. We estimate the following model for each item, using information from other students in that year, grade and subject.
(1)
where Y isc indicates the response of student s in class c on item i, the number of possible responses (J) is four, and X s is a vector that includes measures of prior and future student achievement in math and reading as well as demographic variables (such as race, gender and free lunch status) for student s. Thus, a student's predicted probability of choosing a particular response is identified by the likelihood of other students (in the same year, grade and subject) with similar background characteristics choosing that response.
Notice that by including future as well as prior test scores in the model we decrease the likelihood that students with unusually good teachers will be identified as cheaters, since these students will likely retain some of the knowledge learned in the base year and thus have higher future test scores. Also note that by estimating the probability of selecting each possible response, rather than simply estimating the probability of choosing the correct response, we take advantage of any additional information that is provided by particular response patterns in a classroom.
Using the estimates from this model, we calculate the predicted probability that each student would answer each item in the way that he or she in fact did. This provides us with one measure per student per item. Taking the product over items within student, we calculate the probability that a student would have answered a string of consecutive questions from item m to item n as he or she did: To create our first indicator of suspicious string patterns, we take the minimum of the predicted block probability for each classroom. To create a classroom level measure of the response to item i, we need to combine the information for each student. First, we sum the residuals for each response across students within a classroom. We then calculate a measure of how much the response pattern of student s differed from the response pattern of other students with the same aggregate score. We do so by subtracting a student's answer on item i from the mean response of all students with aggregate score A, squaring these deviations and then summing across all items on the exam.
We then subtract out the mean deviation for all students with the same aggregate score, A Z , and sum the students within each classroom to obtain our final indicator.
Measure 4:
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